Assertions

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In summary, the transcripts of the JCVI/DH meetings from the period from 1983 to 2010 appear toshow that:

1. 1)  Instead of reacting appropriately by re-examining existing vaccination policies when safetyconcerns over specific vaccines were identified by their own investigations, the JCVI eithera) took no action, b) skewed or selectively removed unfavourable safety data from publicreports and c) made intensive efforts to reassure both the public and the authorities in thesafety of respective vaccines;

2. 2)  Significantly restricted contraindication to vaccination criteria in order to increasevaccination rates despite outstanding and unresolved safety issues;

3. 3)  On multiple occasions requested from vaccine manufacturers to make specific amendmentsto their data sheets, when these were in conflict with JCVI’s official advices onimmunisations;

4. 4)  Persistently relied on methodologically dubious studies, while dismissing independentresearch, to promote vaccine policies;

5. 5)  Persistently and categorically downplayed safety concerns while over-inflating vaccinebenefits;

6. 6)  Promoted and elaborated a plan for introducing new vaccines of questionable efficacy andsafety into the routine paediatric schedule, on the assumption that the licenses wouldeventually be granted;

7. 7)  Actively discouraged research on vaccine safety issues;

8. 8)  Deliberately took advantage of parents’ trust and lack of relevant knowledge onvaccinations in order to promote a scientifically unsupported immunisation program whichcould put certain children at risk of severe long-term neurological damage;

Notably, all of these actions appear to violate the JCVI’s own Code of Practice (http://www.dh.gov.uk/prod_consum_dh/groups/dh_digitalassets/@dh/@ab/documents/digitalasset/dh_115363.pdf).

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Evidence

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I here provide the evidence in support of each of the above assertions. (Note: emphasis addedthroughout the text as underlined are by the author unless otherwise indicated)

1) Instead of reacting appropriately by re-examining existing vaccination policieswhen safety concerns over specific vaccines were identified by their owninvestigations, the JCVI either a) took no action, b) skewed or selectively removedunfavourable safety data from public reports and/or c) made intensive efforts toreassure both the public and the authorities in the safety of respective vaccines.

As early as 1981, the JCVI had substantial documentation which associated the measlesvaccine with serious adverse reactions including death and long-term adverse neurologicaloutcomes. At the JCVI meeting held on 9th April 1981 (http://www.dh.gov.uk/ab/DH_095169), in discussing a paper that summarised all the reports of adverse reactions tothe CSM, the following was noted:

(5.b.) Adverse Reactions to measles vaccine

“All reports since 1970 of encephalitis, encephalopathy or sudden death shortly aftervaccination had been reviewed; 60 patients were involved of whom 8 had died, 36 hadmade an apparent complete recovery and 16 were left with permanent sequelae. The highproportion of deaths and patients with sequelae was surprising in comparison with thefindings of the NCES [National Childhood Encephalopathy Study].”(5.b. Adverse Reactions tomeasles vaccine)

By 1983, the JCVI appeared to have had more evidence that the measles vaccine couldcause encephalitis associated with “severe handicap” in a subset of vulnerable children. Atthe JCVI meeting on 17th of June 1983 (http://www.dh.gov.uk/ab/JCVI/DH_120115), theCommittee on Safety of Medicines (CSM) received 66 reports of suspected adverse reactionsto measles vaccines over the period January 1982 to April 1983. According to the transcriptof the meeting:

(7. Suspected adverse reactions to measles vaccine: recent reports to the CSM)

“These included three cases of encephalitis; on follow-up, two of these patients were leftone year later with severe handicap and the third patient, after a year, appeared to bedevelopmentally normal.”

By the end of 1981 serious safety concerns have also been raised with regards to anotherroutine paediatric vaccine, the whooping cough vaccine. At the meeting held on 3rdNovember 1981 (http://www.dh.gov.uk/ab/DH_095169) in section 5 on Whooping Cough:

(5.d. Comments on Professor Stewart’s letter)

“Professor Gilliatt observed that in the Meade Panel Study one-third of children with braindamage were not admitted to hospital. In both the Meade and Dudgeon studies there wereexamples of children who had a fit soon after vaccination which was followed by a fit at alater time and then followed by cessation of development. It was very difficult to assessthis as a random event.”

Furthermore:

“The Chairman concluded that much was not known about the natural history of braindamage in the young.”

In spite of this, three years later, at the meeting on 25th of April 1986 (http://www.dh.gov.uk/ab/DH_095169), the JCVI concluded their discussion on suspected adverse

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reactions for the period 19th September 1985 to 15th of January 1986 with the followingstatement:

(11.4)

“The Committee agreed to a suggestion from the Chairman that in future it would acceptreports on adverse reactions as “for information” only.” [their emphasis added-quotationmarks]

It is somewhat perplexing why the JCVI adopted what appears to be a rather passiveapproach to vaccine safety, in light of the severe adverse reactions that were reported atthat meeting. These included cot deaths, convulsions and anaphylaxis (11.4).

The JCVI appeared to have had other solutions for dealing with vaccine safety concerns. In a“commercial in confidence” CSM/JCVI/Joint Sub-Committee on Adverse Reactions to Vaccinationand Immunisation (ARVI) meeting on 7th February 1986 (http://www.dh.gov.uk/en/FreedomOfInformation/Freedomofinformationpublicationschemefeedback/FOIreleases/DH_4135306), in a discussion about a surveillance study on adverse reactions to two measlesvaccines, the members noted that:

“...results showed that 70 per cent of children were well after receiving Attenuvax and 61per cent after receiving Rimevax. If children with mild general reactions were added tothose who were apparently well then the numbers associated with Attenuvax were 85 percent and those with Rimevax 80 per cent.” (7.1 PHLS [Public Health Laboratory Service]surveillance of adverse reactions to two measles vaccine (Rimevax and Attenuvax))

In other words, even skewing the data by adding cases of mild reactions to those who were“apparently” well, did far from producing a reassuring statistic in favour of the safety of themeasles vaccines, as it still implied a rate of 15-20% of vaccine-associated serious adverse reactions(as opposed to 30-39% of mild-to-serious adverse reactions in total). After further discussion on thistopic:

“...it was agreed there was now enough information to stop the study.”

While at the same time, there appeared to be no incentive to reconsider the current immunisationpolicy, in fact, it seemed more reasonable to conclude that some of the suspected adversereactions to measles vaccine:

“...were unlikely to be associated with the use of measles vaccine and were more likely tobe temper tantrums.” (7.2 Suspected adverse reactions to measles vaccine: a summary ofrecent reports to the CS, June 1983 to September 1985)

The summary of suspected adverse reactions to DTP vaccine administered alone or with oral polio(OPV) during the period 19th September 1985 to 15th January 1986, presented at the same“confidential” meeting (CSM/JCVI/Joint Sub-Committee ARVI, 7th February 1986) were moredifficult to ascribe to “temper tantrums”:

(9.(1))

“Ninety such adverse reactions have been registered. These included six patients withconvulsions, one a patient with abnormal fever following vaccination and one patient withapparent cerebral irritability; in addition two cot deaths were reported. (i) Case No.154043 A three-month old boy who after his first dose of Trivax AD and OPV on 17September 1985 was found dead 18 hours after immunisation....(ii) Case No. 154080 Athree-month old girl who received her first dose of Trivax and OPV on the 19 September1985 and was found dead on the night of 21/22 September 1985. No initial adverse reactionto vaccination was reported and the cause of death was stated as SIDS.” [sudden infantdeath syndrome]

By mid to the late 1980s, the JCVI had become increasingly concerned about publicly associatingthe terms “death” and/or “brain damage” with the word “vaccine”, because of the negative

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repercussions they perceived this would have on vaccination policy (CSM/JCVI/Joint Sub-CommitteeARVI meetings on 7th February 1986; 3rd October 1986; http://www.dh.gov.uk/en/FreedomOfInformation/Freedomofinformationpublicationschemefeedback/FOIreleases/DH_4135306). Such concerns were also exacerbated by the increasing burden of litigations aboutpertussis vaccine-suspected injuries (JCVI meeting on 22nd April 1988; 20th October 1988; http://www.dh.gov.uk/ab/DH_095169), and the possibility that vaccination could be linked to some casesof SIDS, as evident from the Reports on Yellow Cards quoted above.

At the meeting on 22nd April 1988 (http://www.dh.gov.uk/ab/DH_095169), in an ongoing discussionabout the Loveday v Renton litigation, the Chairman:

“...reminded members that they had asked for a list of documents disclosed. JCVI (88)1provided such a list, but it should not be made public. Dr Salisbury said that theDepartment’s solicitors had advised that a part of the section on whooping cough in therevised Memorandum was in conflict with the judgement in the above-mentioned case.They had recommended that any statement on the risk of neurological reaction shouldavoid any estimate of the size of the risk of death or permanent brain damage. Dr Salisburysaid that paragraph 3.4.1c of the section on whooping cough in the Memorandum had beenmodified accordingly and this modification was tabled. Professor Miller observed that theconclusion to be reached from the judgment of the Court and from the assessment of thescientific evidence of risk of neurological reactions and their consequences, were notnecessarily the same. The legal judgement was that there is insufficient evidence, on thebalance of probabilities that the vaccine causes permanent damage to allow any claim fordamages to succeed. The JCVI was concerned with the implications of scientific assessmentof the evidence for vaccine policy purposes. On this basis he was content to quote thefigure for attributable risk of serious neurological illness without giving a figure for the riskof permanent damage, which was consistent with the conclusion of the NCES quoted in theWhooping Cough Report 1981.”(Item 5, page 4 – Loveday v Renton)

The extent of the JCVI’s concerns with the implications of scientific assessment of vaccine safetyon vaccine policy explains why they were opposed to any long-term surveillance for severeneurological disorders following vaccination. In fact, as it will be shown below in greater detail, theCSM/JCVI/ARVI

considered such studies “unreasonable” and paradoxically, ARVI even “deprecated the use of theterm ‘brain damage’” (CSM/JCVI/Joint Sub-Committee ARVI meeting held on 7th February 1986;http://www.dh.gov.uk/en/FreedomOfInformation/Freedomofinformationpublicationschemefeedback/FOIreleases/DH_4135306).

In 1989, 10 years prior to the “controversial” Lancet report by Wakefield et al. [3], the JCVIappeared to have been fully aware of the outcomes of the investigation carried out by the NationalInstitute for Biological Standards and Control (NIBSC), which unequivocally established a linkbetween the mumps component of the MMR vaccine (the Urabe-9 strain) and cases of vaccine-induced meningitis/encephalitis. In response to this, the JCVI appeared to have actively engaged inskewing and censoring data available to the public, continued to use the Urabe-9 containing MMRvaccines and made intensive efforts to reassure both the public and the authorities of the safety ofall MMR vaccines.

According to the transcript of the JCVI meeting on 3rd November 1989 (http://www.dh.gov.uk/ab/DH_095169), the causal agent of vaccine-induced meningitis/encephalitis was unequivocallyidentified:

(9. ARVI Committee – Minutes of meeting 6 October 1989 (JCVI (89)25)

“Prof Collee expressed gratitude to the NIBSC for the progress it achieved in developingtechniques to identify wild and vaccine virus strains. Dr Schild reported that NIBSC was nowable to distinguish clearly the wild strains from each of the two vaccines, and isolates fromCSF clearly showed Urabe in all three cases believed to be associated with vaccine-althoughit should not be assumed that Jeryl-Lynn is not capable of the same result. Professor Colleeadded that no mumps vaccine could be said to be void of risk. Dr Schild said NIBSC wouldbe happy to continue analysing samples.”

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In the following meeting on 17th September 1990, the JCVI CSM/DH Joint Sub-Committee on AdverseReactions (http://www.dh.gov.uk/ab/JCVI/DH_095294), on reviewing the adverse reactions to theMMR vaccine reported on Yellow Cards, applied the following criteria to the assessments:

(6.3.1.)

“Definite=Virus isolated from CSF [cerebrospinal fluid], time course of 14-28 days;Possible/probable=Cells isolated from CSF, no virus in CSF, acceptable time course” [their

emphasis added-underlined]
The transcript then states:
“It was noted that there were 10 definite cases of meningitis/encephalitis.”Both definite and probable cases were then discussed in some detail:(6.3.4.)

“It was noted that the mumps viruses obtained from two out of three cases fromNottingham were sequenced and shown to be vaccine related. The patients had all beenvaccinated from different batches and did not live close to each other.”

At the 17th September 1990 meeting (http://www.dh.gov.uk/ab/JCVI/DH_095294), the JCVICSM/DH Joint Sub-Committee on Adverse Reactions did recognize the need to do a follow-up analyses for long-term neurological outcomes in all cases of meningitis/encephalitisassociated with the MMR vaccine. It was also recognized that the current avenues foradverse reactions reporting (via the Yellow Card, the British Paediatric Surveillance Unit(BPSU) scheme, directly to Communicable Disease Surveillance Centre (CDSC) and throughLaboratory reports) were inadequate for detailed epidemiological evaluations. The JCVICSM/DH Joint Sub-Committee then stated that:

(6.4)

“In order to further validate vaccine related illnesses, fuller studies would be required.”Despite these unresolved safety issues, the conclusion reached at the meeting was that:(6.7)

“There should be no change in the present recommendations or supply of MMR vaccine onthe evidence available to us at the present time.”

Thus, instead of re-evaluating the vaccination policy, at least until safety concerns werefully evaluated, the JCVI choose to support the existing policy based on incompleteevidence that was available at that time.

Furthermore, at the 17th September 1990 meeting (http://www.dh.gov.uk/ab/JCVI/DH_095294), the JCVI appeared to have been fully aware of increasing numbers of cases ofmumps vaccine-associated aseptic meningitis occurring in Japan, since at the time of themeeting, they had been presented with a draft of a study by Sugiura et al. [4]. TheJapanese study found that among 630,157 recipients of the MMR vaccine containing theUrabe-9 mumps vaccine, there were at least 311 meningitis cases suspected to be vaccine-related. In 96 of these 311 cases, mumps virus related to the vaccine was isolated from theCSF. Sugiura et al. [4] noted that this was an unusually high incidence of vaccine-relatedadverse outcomes, which they had attributed in part to “adverse media publicity”.Nonetheless, the fact that in almost one third of the cases, the vaccine strain had beenisolated from the CSF of children, suggests that safety concerns over the MMR werewarranted. Indeed, in 1993 the Japanese suspended the use of the MMR vaccines containingthe Urabe strain due to it causing a high incidence of aseptic meningitis, and reverted tothe use of monovalent measles, mumps and rubella vaccines. According to Japanese HealthAuthorities, the withdrawal of the MMR had not caused an increase in deaths from wild

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measles infection. Noteworthy, in a BBC news report (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/1808316.stm), a spokesperson for the Japan’s Health Ministry stated that:

“...more children had died from the disease during the period when MMR was being used.”In reference to the Japanese study, the JCVI transcript specifically states:(6.6)“The paper confirmed information from Japan previously disclosed to ARVI.”

This suggests that the JCVI knew for some time that the Urabe-9 vaccine was causingproblems and yet, did not consider the possibility to temporarily suspend its use.

Furthermore, four months prior to the 17th September 1990 meeting, at the JCVI 4th May 1990meeting (http://www.dh.gov.uk/ab/DH_095169), ARVI expressed concerns regarding the reportsfrom Japan. The major reason for these concerns was not that the JCVI/ARVI were in favour ofusing the Urabe-9 vaccine which was now associated with increased risk of meningitis/encephalitisin children, but rather:

(9.1.)

“Professor Banatvala was concerned about the possibility of the Japanese experience beingpublished widely in the UK, and urged the gathering of information on the various episodesfrom all MMR manufacturers.”

ARVI also reached a rather surprising conclusion that:

“The Japanese experience may be due to different reporting/investigating criteria or otherlocal factors.”

However, if this were the case, “the Japanese experience” would have been an isolated event.That this was not the case can be clearly seen from further readings of the JCVI 4th May 1990meeting transcript (http://www.dh.gov.uk/ab/DH_095169):

(9.3.a.)

“Dr Thores spoke to the letter, JCVI/90/10, from Dr McIntyre. He highlighted SHHD[Scottish Home and Health Department] concern about the Canadian decision not to useUrabe strain vaccine, the cases of neurological complications in Japan, the seeming bias ofthe UK adverse reactions towards Scotland, and the continued use of vaccine distributionfigures as the denominator when calculating adverse reaction rates.”

In spite of this, instead of re-evaluating or suspending the existing MMR vaccination policydue to safety concerns, the JCVI called for a specific and concentrated effort aimed atcounteracting the growing public and health authorities’ concern over the safety of theUrabe-9 MMR vaccines.

(9.3.c.)

“Professor Peckham told the Committee that she was aware of three districts changingfrom use of Urabe to Jeryl Lynn vaccine, and therefore the Committee needed to reassureauthorities of the safety of all MMR vaccines.”

Hence, it appears that the JCVI’s solution to the growing problem regarding the MMRvaccine safety issues was to provide as little information as possible to health practitioners,in order to preserve the JCVI’s vaccination policy. If this assumption is correct, does itsuggest that the JCVI was more concerned about boosting vaccine uptake than child safety?

(9.3.e.)

“The Chairman asked the Committee if it thought necessary to draw up a statement aboutMMR.”

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“Professor Hull suggested a simple sheet with ARVI’s evaluation of the vaccines. This wouldlet doctors know that an expert committee had looked at the situation and perhapsreassure them.”

What appears to be a rather inadequate handling of the MMR safety concerns on behalf ofthe JCVI did not make the problem go away. Only a year later, at 1st November 1991meeting (http://www.dh.gov.uk/ab/JCVI/DH_095050), unable to resolve the continuingMMR safety issues the JCVI turned to vaccine manufacturers for help:

(7.1 Report on MMR)

“On adverse reactions to the vaccine, the most worrying reports had been studies whichshowed problems with the Urabe vaccine, particularly Mumps Meningitis. Reports had alsocome from overseas countries, Canada being the most helpful....of 67 reported casesbetween October 1988 and August 1990, 38 children had definite or probable AsepticMeningitis and one Encephalitis. Ten of these were definitely caused by the vaccine, and afurther 29 were probably caused by the vaccine. Of these 39 children, 37 were followed upat 12 months. 33 (or 89%) were neuro-developmentally normal. Of the remaining four, twohad neuro-developmental problems before being given MMR, one had behaviour problemsand one had a cerebral astrocytoma. There had been eight reports of nerve deafnessalthough one was pre-MMR; six needed further investigation. The over-all picture was thatthere were 3.7 cases per 100,000 doses of Urabe vaccine and no cases reported with theJeryl Lynn vaccine. However, the MSD [Merck Sharp and Dohme] vaccine was generally notwell accepted because of pain at the injection site. Urabe is the most reactogenic vaccinebut some data suggested that it may also be the most immunogenic. It was impossible tomake a firm decision about this until all information had been collected.”

(Note: it ought to be asked why the UK health authorities thought it was appropriate tovaccinate children with neurodevelopmental problems and cerebral astrocytoma with avaccine that had caused substantial worries to them over its association with adversereactions affecting the brain).

(7.2 Discussions with Manufacturers)

“Dr Salisbury reported on his recent meetings with Merieux, MSD and SKB [SmithklineBeecham]. Information was shared and details of adverse events discussed. Themanufacturers felt that the Department’s line-that is, surveying adverse events andchecking immunogenicity-was correct.”

Again, the JCVI appeared to have adopted a passive approach to the problem and made noapparent efforts to identify specific sub-groups of children who may have been more proneto adverse reactions to the MMR. At the meeting that followed on 1st May 1992 (http://www.dh.gov.uk/ab/JCVI/DH_095050), the same conclusions were reiterated in light of thecontinuing MMR crisis, with an additional concern that the actual number of vaccine-associated aseptic meningitis cases might have been higher, due to suspectedunderreporting:

(7.4 Report of North Herts Immunogenicity Study (Dr Elizabeth Miller))

“The report of a cluster of CSF mumps virus positive cases in Nottingham had causedconcern that national surveillance may have been underreporting the incidence of cases; ameeting had been held to discuss the Nottingham situation and the national data....InNottingham all children with febrile convulsions were lumbar punctured, unlike some otherareas from where reports had been received (Preston and Ashford) .The Committee agreedthat no conclusion could be reached until the full immunogenicity results were available aswell as the full analysis of the Nottingham and other data.”

In the meantime, no changes were made to the immunisation policies. Would a seeminglypassive approach to child health and safety, suggest that the JCVI in essence agreed to thefact that during the surveillance for the purposes of “for information only”, some cases of

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suspected vaccine-induced convulsions, meningitis/encephalitis and deaths in childrenwould just have to be tolerated?

Note also that for using the same technique of lumbar puncture, 18 years later, Dr AndrewWakefield who investigated a consecutive series of children with chronic enterocolitis andregressive developmental disorder which appeared to have been linked to MMR vaccination, wascharged and found unfit to practice medicine by the UK General Medical Council (GMC). Accordingto the GMC hearing, lumbar puncture in children with MMR-suspected adverse neurological outcomewas apparently ”not clinically indicated” (http://www.gmc-uk.org/static/documents/content/Wakefield__Smith_Murch.pdf).

In July 1992, the data from Nottingham became available, nonetheless, it took another two monthsbefore the JCVI and the DH finally decided to take action, apparently not so much because ofsafety concerns but more so because of the legal advice given to the manufacturers by theirlawyers in response to which the manufacturers decided to stop producing the Urabe-9 containingMMR vaccines. According to the transcript of the JCVI meeting on 6th November 1992 (http://www.dh.gov.uk/ab/JCVI/DH_095050):

(8.1 Report to Sub-Committee on SEAR/CSM: Dr David Salisbury)

“In August, Department of Health officials met with MCA [Medicines Control Agency] andthe manufacturers. At the end of August SKB, acting on the advice of their lawyers, decidedto stop producing vaccine and advise licensing authorities world wide accordingly; theDepartment had, therefore, to act quickly.”

Thus, only when the alarm was sounded by the manufacturers’ lawyers did the DH sense that thematters regarding the safety of the MMR vaccine required some urgency. In addition, it appears thatthe principal preoccupation of the European Authorities was how to preserve global vaccine policiesin face of the Urabe-9 scandal.

“On the 3 and 4 September the Chief Medical Officers of European Community countrieswere advised in confidence of the situation at a routine meeting. ARGOS/SEAR [Sub-Committee on Safety, Efficiency (SEAR) and the Adverse Reaction Group of SEAR (ARGOS)]agreed on 4 September that no action would be taken to revoke the manufacturer’s licenseas a change of purchasing policy was to be made by the Department; revoking the licensewould have caused a world-wide vaccine crisis.”

The actual rate of aseptic meningitis after the MMR vaccination was discussed later on the JCVI 6thNovember 1992 meeting agenda (http://www.dh.gov.uk/ab/JCVI/DH_095050):

(8.7 Risk of aseptic meningitis after MMR vaccination in UK children: Dr Elizabeth Miller)

“The overall risk of this complication in the UK was 1 per 10,000 immunised children but, inNottingham, this had increased to 1 in 4,000. Tests in Canada in 1989 had associated theUrabe vaccine with meningitis. The linking of laboratory records of CSE samples withdistrict computer databases on immunisation had been very effective. The Committee wastold that all the countries which had had a choice had switched from the Urabe to JerylLynn;”

What is rather astonishing is that the four-year old Canadian concerns over the safety profile of theMMR vaccine (which had been confirmed in 1989), were apparently ignored by the JCVI or at least,not given much credence. While the Canadian Health Authorities suspended the use of the Urabe-9MMR in 1988, the UK introduced it along with a vigorous promotional campaign. In a confidentialmeeting of the JCVI Working Party on the introduction of measles, mumps, rubella (MMR) vaccineon 11th February 1988 (http://www.dh.gov.uk/ab/JCVI/DH_095297):

(5. MMR vaccination in Canada)

“Members read a report of cases of mumps encephalitis which had been associated withMMR vaccine containing the URABE strain of the mumps virus. The Canadian authorities hadsuspended the licences of MMR vaccines containing the URABE strain, but Dr Salisburyconsidered that the data on which the decision had been based was slender.”

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The JCVI also had a specific plan to combat any adverse publicity in case any of this “confidential”information was to reach the public:

“A statement would be prepared in anticipation of any adverse publicity which mightarise.”

(7. Publicity)

“A paper prepared by the MMR Publicity Group was presented, by Mr Flaherty and Mr Reid,for the Group to discuss and to approve the general approach it contained. Dr Rossconsidered that the priority was to get the message across to doctors, health visitors andnurses.”

Finally, the JCVI also had a number of funding strategies in place to promote the introduction ofthe MMR:

(9. Funding situation)

“£800,000 had been set aside for publicity and £1.4 million had been set aside to cover theperiod October 1988 - March 1989 to assist health authorities with increased vaccine costs,the education of professionals and for the re-programming of child computers. Membersnoted that the Statement of Fees and Allowances would need altering to include item ofservice payment for MMR.”

This latter strategy was further refined on the JCVI Working Party on the introduction of MMRvaccine following meeting, on 17th May 1988 (http://www.dh.gov.uk/ab/JCVI/DH_095297):

(3. Matters Arising)

“Dr McGuiness suggested that instead of an item of service payment GPs might be paidaccording to their immunization rates.”

In spite of carefully elaborated advertising and substantial investments, the JCVI did not entirelysucceed in countering public concerns over vaccine safety, as on 6th October 1989 (http://www.dh.gov.uk/ab/JCVI/DH_095294):

(5.2.6)

“The meeting’s further sadness was expressed over the press reports, which could haveharmful implications and unnecessarily damage public confidence in vaccines.”

Regrettably, similar sadness was apparently not expressed by the JCVI members over a report of avaccine-suspected death of a 16 month old child, which was discussed at the same meeting.Rather:

(5.2.4)

“This was a fiscal case and as such was highly confidential. Doubts were expressed aboutthe cause of death, and while it was not possible to give clear judgement, it was felt thatthere was unlikely to have been a causal relationship with the vaccine and that this was anunusual case.”

Science should be based on facts and experimental evidence, not feelings.

As for the alleged “slender” Canadian data on safety hazards of the SKF (Smith Kline and French)Urabe MMR vaccine, in a confidential JCVI CSM/DH Joint Sub-committee on Adverse Reactionsmeeting on 7th March 1990 (http://www.dh.gov.uk/ab/JCVI/DH_095294) the following wasdisclosed:

(6. Adverse reactions to MMR vaccine)

“In Canada, the MSD vaccine had been used exclusively [Jeryl Lynn strain-containing MMR].Following the introduction of SKF product, the cases of meningoencephalitis had been

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